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I. INTRODUCrION
"A child miseducated is a child lost."'
-President John F. Kennedy, 1963 State of the Union Address
Texas is in grave danger of losing a generation of children to miseduca-
tion.2 The United States Supreme Court has held that "education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local governments."3
Accordingly, one would think that the State of Texas would make every
effort to ensure that all schools in the state receive adequate funding to
meet minimum educational requirements. However, over the past two
decades it has become increasingly clear that the Texas school finance
system is grossly inadequate.4
1. Bartleby.com, Simpson's Contemporary Quotations, http://www.bartleby.com/63/
88/2688.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
2. See Ralph Blumenthal, School Financing Fix Eludes Texas Lawmakers Again, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al (noting that Texas high school graduation rates are the lowest
in the country).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). The Court goes further in articu-
lating the importance of education by stating that, "It is the very foundation of good citi-
zenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms." Id.
4. See generally Blumenthal, supra note 2 (summarizing the problems Texas has faced
with school financing); see also J. Steven Farr & Mark Trachtenberg, The Edgewood
Drama: An Epic Quest for Education Equity, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 607 (1999)
(describing the legal debate Texas has faced with its school finance system).
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To date, the current school finance system has failed to address the
changing demographics of the state. The low-income student population,
made up of mostly Hispanic and African American pupils, continues to
grow every year.5 For example, in 2004 ninety-five percent of students in
the Edgewood School District, located in San Antonio, Texas, were con-
sidered "economically disadvantaged."6 Generally, it costs more to edu-
cate these low-income students.' Steve Murdock, a state education
demographer, believes that if the number of low-income students contin-
ues to increase and the gap of achievement between average students and
economically disadvantaged students widens further, the current genera-
tion of Texas children may "become the state's first generation whose
future will be less prosperous than their parents'."8 Additionally, be-
cause the best predictor of household incomes is education, if the educa-
tion system fails to procure better funding and services for economically
disadvantaged students, the average household income in Texas could
drop over the next generation.9 Despite the warnings of the serious nega-
tive effects the current school funding system is having on economically
disadvantaged students, the State of Texas has failed to successfully cor-
rect this intolerable situation.
The Legislature has made multiple attempts to fix this glaring problem
of inequity within the Texas school finance system with a patchwork,
"band-aid" approach.'0 The depth of the school finance problem in
Texas can be best understood within the context of a comment made by
the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, Tom Craddick: "One
of the grievances of those who fought at the Alamo was Mexico's failure
to establish a school system. We still have today the same problem. I just
wanted to tell the people of Texas we didn't create the school problem. It
started at the Alamo."" Representative Craddick made this comment in
5. Gary Scharrer, Schools Speak Out on English Woes, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss NEWS,
July 14, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.mysantonio.com/news/education/stories/mysa
071405.1A.texas-students.67375553.html (discussing the increased costs associated with
teaching students with limited English proficiency).
6. Id. Please note that the term "economically disadvantaged" is not used in the
Texas Education Code. See TEx. EDUC. CODE AtN. § 5.001 (Vernon & Supp. 2004-2005)
(defining "educationally disadvantaged" as being "eligible to participate in the national
free or reduce-priced lunch program established under 42 U.S.C. Section 1751 et. seq.").
Throughout the remainder of this comment the terms "economically disadvantaged" and
"educationally disadvantaged" are used interchangeably.
7. Scharrer, supra note 5.
8. Id. (quoting Steve Murdock).
9. Id. (quoting Steve Murdock).
10. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 11), 804 S.W.2d 491, 496
(Tex. 1989) (adjudicating the constitutionality of the Texas school finance program).
11. Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Lawmakers Meet, with Education Atop Agenda, N.Y.
TimEs, Jan. 12, 2005, at Al (describing the Texas Legislature's response to Judge Dietz
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jest, but it underscores Texas's long historical battle with the provision of
adequate public school funding.
Since 1989, the Supreme Court of Texas has found the state's school
funding system to be unconstitutional in four separate decisions. 2 In
Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood I), the court
found that the then existing school finance system violated Article VII,
Section 1 of the Texas Constitution and therefore was unconstitutional 3
This provision required the state to support and maintain an "efficient
system of free public schools."' 4 The court held that the state failed to
maintain an efficient system.15 The second case in which the Supreme
Court of Texas found that the existing Texas school finance system was
unconstitutional was Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood II).16 In this case, the court held that the legislature failed in
its attempt to fix the previous finance system condemned in the
Edgewood I decision." Finally, in Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indepen-
dent School District v. Edgewood (Edgewood III), the court found that
the then current school finance system was still unconstitutional because
the legislation, which was enacted to reform the system, instead imposed
a statewide ad valorem tax which was barred by the Texas Constitution.' 8
Following each of these decisions, attempts were made to rectify the con-
stitutionality of the school finance system. Nonetheless, much more pro-
ruling in West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, GV-100528 (250th Dist.
Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 30 2004).
12. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex.
2005); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood 111), 826 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 491;
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
13. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential
to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for support and mainte-
nance of an efficient system of public free schools.").
14. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
15. Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 397 ("We hold that the state's school financing system
is neither financially efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a 'general diffusion
of knowledge' statewide, and therefore that it violates article VII, section 1 of the Texas
Constitution.").
16. Edgewood H, 804 S.W.2d at 491.
17. Id. at 496.
18. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Tex. 1992); see also TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e. An
ad valorem tax is "[a] tax imposed proportionally on the value of something (esp. real
property), rather than on its quantity or some other measure." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY, 1183 (8th ed. 2004).
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gress is needed; the Texas public school system is still defined by the
"haves" and the "have nots."'19
The latest challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas school finance
system was considered by Judge John Dietz of the 250th District Court of
Travis County, Texas.2" On November 30, 2004, Judge Dietz issued a fi-
nal judgment finding the current school finance system unconstitu-
tional.2 ' Judge Dietz held that school districts have been denied the
discretion to set their tax rates due to the fact that most districts are
forced to meet minimum state requirements by setting local property
taxes at maximum allowable rates.22 Additionally, the-district court held
the current school finance system to be financially "inefficient, inade-
quate and unsuitable., 23 Finally, Dietz held that "property poor districts
do not have substantially equal access to facilities funding in violation of
the efficiency and suitability provisions" of the Texas Constitution. 24 This
decision sent shockwaves throughout the judicial and legislative branches
of the Texas government. The Texas Attorney General's Office immedi-
ately sought to appeal the decision directly to the Supreme Court of
Texas.25
The Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on July 6, 2005 and on
November 22 of the same year ruled that the current school finance sys-
tem is unconstitutional.26 The court held that the system has taken away
all discretion from local school districts as to what tax rate they are going
to charge their residents.27 This system constitutes a de facto state ad
valorem tax that is prohibited by article VIII, section 1-e of the Texas
Constitution.2' Accordingly, the court found that the current school fi-
nance system did not withstand constitutional scrutiny. However, the
court failed to hold that the system was inadequate, inefficient, or unsuit-
able in funding for its attempts to disseminate a general diffusion of
knowledge as required by article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitu-
19. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 597 (Tex.
2003).
20. Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-
100528 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex., Nov. 30 2004).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Jason Embry, Judge Spells Out School Finance Decision, AUSTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al (summarizing Judge Deitz's holding).
26. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex.
2005).
27. Id. at 797-98.
28. Id.
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tion.29 The court held that while the current system constitutes an imper-
missible statewide ad valorem tax, it does provide sufficient funding to
meet statutory and constitutional requirements.3 °
The goal of this comment is to a give a voice to the economically disad-
vantaged students that the current school finance system ignores. This
comment will focus on the historical background of the Texas school fi-
nance system and the adverse effect the system has on economically dis-
advantaged and minority students. Part II begins with a detailed analysis
of past constitutional challenges to the system and the evolution of Texas
public school funding programs. Part III considers the most recent chal-
lenges to the Texas school finance system. Part IV examines the effect
inadequate funding has on minority and economically disadvantaged stu-
dents. Part V explores proposed solutions and proper resolutions to cre-
ate an adequate and equal opportunity school finance system. Part VI
synthesizes the current state of the law and recommends the proper
course of conduct for the courts and legislature.
II. THE HISTORY OF TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
A. General History of Texas School Finance Law
As the Texas Supreme Court has noted, "[t]he history of Texas school
finance has been one of a "'rough accommodation of interests in an effort
to arrive at practical and workable solutions."' 3 ' When the Texas Consti-
tution was implemented in 1876, it called for the distribution of state edu-
cation funds on a student-by-student basis.32 In other words, the Texas
education system began with funding provided exclusively by the state
itself. However, in 1883 the Constitution was amended to permit the cre-
ation of local school districts.33 These school districts were allowed to
assess taxes on local residences in order to supplement state public school
funding.34 Thus began the long road toward local control over the Texas
school finance system.
29. Id. at 789-90.
30. Id. at 754.
31. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.(Edgewood 1II), 826 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex. 1992) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1972)).
32. Id.; see also Maurice Dyson, The Death of Robin Hood? Proposals for Overhaul-
ing Public School Finance, 11 GEO. J. ON L. & POL'Y 1, 7 (2004) (discussing the effects of
"Robin Hood" on the Texas School Finance System).
33. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 494.
34. Id. ("From 1906 to 1989, the portion of total state school funding contributed by
local tax revenue increased from 24 percent to 53 percent.").
[Vol. 8:307
WHAT ABOUT OUR FUTURE
It soon became apparent to the State Legislature that school districts,
and subsequently tax revenues, did not grow at equal rates. The large
disparity in wealth among various districts continued to grow as the Texas
economy developed more industrial strength.36 Rural districts have rela-
tively little property value when compared with large metropolitan ar-
eas.37 The Texas Supreme Court articulated this problem when saying
that "[t]he inequality of educational opportunities in the main arises from
natural conditions.... The type of school which any community can have
must depend upon the population of the community, the productivity of
its soil, and generally its taxable wealth. ' 38
Accordingly, in 1949 the public school finance system was largely re-
structured.39  The Legislature enacted a system called the Minimum
Foundation Program.4 ° The program was intended to guarantee a mini-
mum amount of funding for each student in the state.41 The state was to
supply the program with approximately eighty percent of its funds, with
the remaining twenty percent to be derived from local taxes.42 The par-
ticular amount of funding guaranteed by the state was determined by a
formula based upon a school district's "local fund assignment.,4 3 School
districts were allowed to retain any local money raised that was greater
than the local fund assignment requirements. 44 Therefore, property-rich
districts were able to retain large amounts of money to enrich their edu-
cational offering due to their high tax base; whereas property-poor school
districts were still operating upon the minimum amount of financing sup-
plied by the state.45 This, in addition to various later amendments to the
Minimum Foundation Program, led to great disparity in the quality of
35. Id. at 494-95.
36. Id. at 495.
37. Id. (noting that by 1915 the Texas Legislature had to provide aid to rural school
districts due to inequity in funding).
38. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 495 (quoting Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31, 36
(Tex. 1931)).
39. Id.
40. Id.; see Gilmer-Aikin Bills, Act of June 1, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 334, 1949 Tex.
Gen. Laws 625; Act of April 28, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 335, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 647
(implementing the structure of the Minimum Foundation Program).
41. Edgewood II1, 826 S.W.2d at 495.
42. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood 1ff), 826 S.W.2d 489, 495 (Tex. 1992).
43. Id. at 495-96. This formula provided that a school district was to raise local funds
to be subtracted against the funding supplied by the state. Id. However, school districts
were not required to raise local funds, but merely encouraged to do so. Id. at 496. Thus,
the state would make up the difference in any school district that failed to raise adequate
local funds. Id.
44. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 496.
45. Id.
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education students were receiving depending upon whether they were lo-
cated in a property-rich or property-poor school district.46
Increasingly, the citizens of Texas, as well as the majority of the state's
school districts, became dissatisfied with the school funding system. The
next logical step was to use the judicial branch of government to remedy
an unconstitutional school finance system. The court challenges that
were to follow came in two definitive phases: (1) federal claims based
upon 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis; and (2) state
claims based upon the interpretation of the educational mandate supplied
by the Texas Constitution.47
B. Phase I: Federal Equal Protection Challenges
The initial federal equal protection phase began in 1973 with Rodriguez
v. San Antonio Independent School District,48 which was the first lawsuit
to challenge the constitutionality of the Texas school finance system.49 In
this case, Demetrio Rodriguez filed a class-action suit on behalf of the
46. Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) for the
proposition that the state "equalizing" system actually produced a greater benefit to
wealthier school districts than poorer districts. The court noted that wealthier districts
were better able to take advantage of the new system because they could enact programs
above and beyond that which property-poor districts could. In other words, wealthier dis-
tricts could create more programs out of their own funds by which the state would partially
subsidize. Property-poor districts did not have the sufficient funds to start these additional
programs and thus could not take full advantage of state funding.); see also Juan Carlos
Sanchez, Texas' Public School Financing: Share and Share Alike - Not!, 19 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 475, 477 (1994).
47. See generally Liz Kramer, Comment, Achieving Equitable Education Through the
Courts: A Comparative Analysis of Three States, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2002) (discussing the
three waves of education finance litigation and focusing on the two waves that have taken
place regarding the Texas School Finance System); see also Farr & Trachtenberg, supra
note 4, at 610-11 (citing Gail F. Levine, Note, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Ap-
proaches to Recent Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 507 (1991);
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994); Julie K. Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'y 517 (1991); Kevin Randall McMillan, Note, The Turning Tide: The Emerging
Fourth Wave of School Finance Reform Litigation and the Courts' Lingering Institutional
Concerns, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1867 (1998)); see also Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, "A" for Effort:
Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and
Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 644 (2001) (raising a general discussion regarding national
education litigation and subsequent responses by State Legislatures); Albert H. Kauffman
& Carmen Maria Rumbaut, Applying Edgewood v. Kirby to Analysis of Fundamental
Rights Under the Texas Constitution, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 69, 75-76 (1990) (discussing an
equal protection claim under the Texas constitution).
48. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281 (W.D. Tex.
1971).
49. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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largely poor and minority student population of the Edgewood Indepen-
dent School District." The Plaintiffs claimed that the Texas school fi-
nance system discriminated amongst its students on the basis of wealth
because of the system's heavy dependence on local property taxes.5'
Property taxes supply the majority of funding for Texas schools.52 The
large disparity in property values between various school districts across
the state created gross inequities in the type of education students were
receiving in property-rich areas and property-poor areas.53 The plaintiffs
claimed that the system violated their 14th Amendment Equal Protection
rights.5 4 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that poor and minority stu-
dents were not given equal access to state funding so as to be provided
with an adequate and equitable education.55
The plaintiffs based their argument upon two grounds: (1) that the
Texas school finance system discriminated against a suspect class: the
poor; and (2) that the school finance system prevented students from ex-
ercising their fundamental right to an equal education.56 The United
States District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and found that the
Texas school finance system was unconstitutional. 7 The district court
found that the system discriminated against a suspect class and prevented
students from exercising their fundamental right to education.58 How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court quickly extinguished this avenue
of school finance reform.59 The Court held that the poor are not a sus-
pect class.' Accordingly, the Court applied the much more lenient ra-
50. Id. at 11-12; see Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281
(W.D. Tex. 1971) (expounding upon the factual background surrounding this decision).
51. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (W.D.
Tex. 1971) (arguing that public education should not be a system based upon wealth, but
instead should be a system of "fiscal neutrality").
52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1973); see Rodriguez
v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281-82 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
53. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (noting that the
inequity in school funding began during the increasing industrialization of Texas and the
large population shift from rural to urban communities).
54. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1973); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
55. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1973) (discussing
large disparities in spending among various school districts).
56. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 281-83 (W.D.
Tex. 1971) (summarizing the claims that plaintiffs brought for relief).
57. Id. at 281.
58. Id. at 282-83, 285 (noting "the crucial nature of education.").
59. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (reversing the lower
court's decision).
60. Id. at 29.
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tional basis test, as opposed to the strict scrutiny test applied by the
District Court, and found that the existing finance system did not violate
the United States Constitution.6' Also, the United States Supreme Court
held that education is not a fundamental right.62 In effect, the Court's
ruling ended the federal equal protection challenges regarding the Texas
school finance system.
C. Phase II: State Constitutional Challenges
The second phase of challenges to school finance funding in Texas is
illustrated through the Edgewood cases.63 These cases were state consti-
tutional challenges to the Texas school finance system. School funding in
Texas is indivisibly linked to each of the following holdings. Below will
be a brief summary of the Edgewood cases.
The finance system challenged in the Rodriguez v. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District action continued largely unchanged until the 1989
case of Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (Edgewood I).64
In Edgewood I, the Edgewood Independent School District, along with
sixty-seven other plaintiffs, brought suit claiming that the school finance
system was unconstitutional under two provisions in the Texas Constitu-
tion: (1) Article I, Section 3, which states that "[a]ll free men, when they
form a social compact,. . . have equal rights;"65 and (2) Article VII, Sec-
tion 1 which states "a general diffusion of knowledge being essential to
the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the
duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provi-
sion for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free
61. Id. at 40-44 (upholding the constitutionality of the school finance plan). The ra-
tional basis test applied by the U.S. Supreme Court "requires only that the State's [school
finance] system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes."
Id. at 40. Whereas, the strict scrutiny test as argued by the plaintiffs mandates that the
government program be "narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmen-
tal interests." See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
62. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1973) ("We are in
complete agreement with the conclusion.. .that 'the grave significance of education both to
the individual and to our society' cannot be doubted. But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental
for purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.").
63. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood V), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995);
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood
II1), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 11), 804
S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d
391 (Tex. 1989).
64. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391.
65. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also Edgewood 1, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (noting that the
lower court relied on Article 1 in its decision).
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schools.",6 6 The Texas Supreme Court held that the then current school
finance system violated Article VII, Section 1, but did not directly ad-
dress the Article I, Section 3 equal protection claim.67 The court con-
cluded that the Texas school finance system was not "efficient" or
"suitable" to adequately fulfill the legislature's duty to disseminate a gen-
eral diffusion of knowledge.68
Edgewood I points out some of the "glaring disparities" in the available
revenue among various school districts due to the wide variation in prop-
erty value from district to district.69 At the time of this suit, the richest
school district in the State had more than $14,000,000 worth of property
per pupil, whereas, the poorest district had only $20,000 worth of prop-
erty per pupil.7 ° This equated to an astounding 700 to 1 ratio.71 Further-
more, "[t]he average property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is
more than twenty times greater than the average property wealth in the
100 poorest districts.",72 The court found that these numbers could not
validate an efficient distribution of a general diffusion of knowledge to all
students across Texas.73
The court went on to define "efficient", as referred to under Article
VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 74 The court held that while effi-
ciency did not require exact equality of funding on a per student basis, it
also did not allow property-rich districts to generate large resources at
little tax effort when property-poor districts must expend a great deal of
effort to receive sufficient revenue to meet minimum education stan-
66. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 393 (quoting TEX. CONST. art VII, § 1).
67. Id. at 397.
68. Id. at 396-97 ("We conclude that, in mandating 'efficiency,' the constitutional
framers and ratifiers did not intend a system with such vast disparities as now exist. In-
stead, they stated clearly that the purpose of an efficient system was to provide for a 'gen-
eral diffusion of knowledge.' (Emphasis added). The present system, by contrast, provides
not for a diffusion that is general, but for one that is limited and unbalanced. The resultant
inequalities are thus directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency.").
69. Id. at 392.
70. Id.
71. Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391. Additionally, the court noted, "The 300,000 stu-
dents in the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's property wealth to
support their education while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools have over
25% of the state's property wealth." Id.
72. Id. This unbelievable inequality in school funding may best be explained by a
comparison of the Edgewood I.S.D. with its wealthier neighbor Alamo Heights I.S.D.
"Edgewood I.S.D. has $38,854 in property wealth per student; Alamo Heights I.S.D., in the
same county, has $570,109 in property wealth per student." Id.
73. See generally id. at 391.
74. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex.
1989) (stating that "efficiency" does not allow for great disparities of tax wealth).
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dards" Instead, "[t]here must be a direct and close correlation between
a district's tax effort and the educational resources available to it; in other
words, districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues
per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.",76 Thus, the court outlined a new
policy that tax efforts, rather than funding itself, must be substantially
equal. The Texas Supreme Court gave the legislature until May 1, 1990 to
fix the school financing system or it would shut down Texas schools.7 7
In response to the Edgewood I decision, the Texas Legislature passed
Senate Bill 1.78 This bill called for equalization of taxation efforts among
ninety-five percent of the state's school districts.79 Senate Bill 1 excluded
the top five percent of the wealthiest school districts because "the annual
cost of equalizing all districts to the revenue levels attainable by the rich-
est districts would be approximately four times the annual cost of operat-
ing the entire state government."80 Accordingly, the legislature was
trying to implement an efficient system to provide for substantially simi-
lar funding for equal tax effort.
Plaintiffs from Edgewood I immediately challenged Senate Bill 1.81 In
Edgewood II these plaintiffs claimed that the new piece of legislation had
not solved the problem of substantially unequal funding.82 The Texas Su-
preme Court agreed, holding that "as a matter of law... the public school
finance system continues to violate article VII, section 1 of the [Texas]
Constitution."83 The Court noted that the system itself required change,
that a temporary approach would not be sufficient, and found that Senate
Bill 1 did not change the boundary of any of the school districts in the
State.84 Likewise, Senate Bill 1 did not change the fact that around fifty
percent of all education funds still come from local real property as op-
posed to independent state funding.85 Moreover, the five percent of
75. Id. In other words, matched dollar-for-dollar funding amongst all districts is not
required but there must be a certain level of equality to meet minimum educational needs.
Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 399.
78. Act of June 7, 1990, 71st Leg., 6th C.S., ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (relating to
public education).
79. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 3, at 648-49.
80. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Tex.
1991).
81. See generally id. (noting that Senate Bill 1 was challenged within one year of its
passing).
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 497 (noting that "vast inefficiencies [existed] in the structure of the [then]
current system."). Additionally, local ad valorem taxes across the state failed to "draw
revenue from all property at a substantially similar rate." Id. at 496.
84. Id. at 496.
85. Edgewood II, 804 S.W.2d at 496.
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schools excluded by the bill "educate[d] approximately 170,000 students
and harbor about 15% of the property wealth in the state."86 Thus, under
Senate Bill 1, the wealthiest five percent of school districts continued to
support 170,000 students from local tax revenues, when this same tax base
would support 1,000,000 students attending the poorest school districts.87
Accordingly, the Court found that Senate Bill 1 failed to remedy the ear-
lier problems of the school funding system and that the Texas School Fi-
nance System remained unconstitutional under Article VII, Section 1.88
Once again the Texas Legislature attempted to respond to the most
recent Supreme Court decision.89 The legislature began debating over
the idea of a recapture system, by which some governmental body would
recapture local tax revenue on a regional basis.90 There were conflicting
interpretations of the Edgewood II decision, some believing that the deci-
sion required a "state-funded school system," while others claimed that
such a "recapture" program was prohibited by the decision issued in Love
v. City of Dallas.91 Ultimately, this debate led to the passage of Senate
Bill 351.92 Senate Bill 351 called for the creation of 188 County Educa-
tion Districts (CEDs).9 3 The sole purpose of the CEDs was to collect
taxes among various regional locations, generally, based upon counties.94
Additionally, the CEDs were designed to create a greater spreading of
86. Id.
87. Id. Therefore, wealthy districts were capable of taxing at much lower rates due to
higher property values, while property-poor districts had to face heavier tax burdens. Id.
88. Id. at 495 (holding that Senate Bill 1 failed to create a school finance system
whereby school districts were given "substantially similar educational revenue for similar
levels of local tax effort.") (citing "Senate Bill 1 amends section 16.001(c)(1) of the Educa-
tion Code to read: 'the yield of state and local educational program revenue per pupil per
cent of effective tax effort shall not be statistically significantly related to local taxable
wealth per student for at least those districts in which 95 percent of students attend school.'
The concept of similar yield for similar rates of taxation has been termed 'fiscal neutral-
ity."' Id.).
89. See Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 653-54 (describing the various ways the
legislature attempted to respond to the Edgewood II decision).
90. Id. at 654.
91. See id. See generally Love v. City of Dallas, 40 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1931) (holding that
the legislature does not have the ability to force the City of Dallas to educate students not
located within the school districts boundaries, unless the City of Dallas is paid adequate
compensation).
92. Act of May 27, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475, 1478
(amending § 20.945 of the Texas Education Code, which described how property tax rates
were to be set within CEDs); see also Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. (Edgewood 1f1), 826 S.W.2d 489, 498 (Tex. 1992).
93. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 3, at 661.
94. Id.
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funding among an area so as to level school funding between property-
rich and property-poor school districts.95
In 1991, Senate Bill 351 was challenged in Carrollton-Farmers Branch
Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District
(Edgewood 11I.96 The plaintiffs alleged that Senate Bill 1 called for the
creation of CEDs which were in violation of Article VIII, Section 1-e of
the Texas Constitution which prohibited implementation of a state ad
valorem tax.97 The plaintiffs also claimed that implementation of Senate
Bill 351 violated Article VII, Section 3 of the Texas Constitution which
forbids the Texas Legislature from raising local school taxes without first
obtaining voter approval.98 The Texas Supreme Court agreed, finding
that Senate Bill 1 violated Article VIII, Section 1-e and Article VII, Sec-
tion 3 of the Texas Constitution.99
D. Texas Education Deemed Constitutional for the Time Being
In 1995, the Texas Supreme Court heard yet another challenge to the
school finance system in Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno
(Edgewood /V). °° In this case, the plaintiffs asserted that the legislature
had once again failed to correct the inefficient school finance system
when passing Senate Bill 7.1°1 However, unlike the previous three
Edgewood decisions, the court held the newly structured Texas school
finance system to be constitutional.1"2
In response to the Edgewood III decision, the Legislature passed Sen-
ate Bill 7103 in an attempt to create an efficient school finance system as is
mandated by Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 10 4 Senate
95. Id.
96. Edgewood 111, 826 S.W.2d at 489 (Tex. 1992).
97. Id. at 493; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e ("No State ad valorem tax shall be
levied upon any property within this State.").
98. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 493.
99. Id. (rejecting appellee's argument that the court had given "pre-approval" to Sen-
ate Bill 351 in the Edgewood H decision); see generally Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Kirby (Edgewood I/), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
100. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.
1995).
101. Id. at 729. The Texas Supreme Court began its decision by noting that in follow-
ing "standard rules of constitutional interpretation" it would presume that Senate Bill 7
was correct. Id. at 25. The plaintiffs had the burden of overcoming this presumption. Id.
This was a clear premonition of the decision to be rendered.
102. See generally id.
103. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S. ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479.
104. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to
the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legisla-
ture of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance
of an efficient system of public free schools.") (emphasis added).
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Bill 7 maintained the basic two-tiered school finance system entitled the
Foundation School Program.1 °5
Tier 1 of the Foundation School Program was created to "guarantee
'sufficient financing for all school districts to provide a basic program of
education... 6 This tier, often referred to as the "basic allotment,"' 7
provides that for every student in average daily attendance, a district is
given a basic statutorily proscribed "allotment" subject to various adjust-
ments and variations due to differences in actual costs among school dis-
tricts. 10 8 In order to receive Tier 1 financing, the prior year tax rate for
the district had to be $0.86 per $100 valuation in property value.'0 9 In
other words, Tier 1 guarantees a school district a set amount of funds per
student, at the present time $2537, if the district is unable to generate this
basic allotment through its own tax base when taxing at the $0.86 per
$100 valuation level. The purpose of Tier 1 funding is to provide suffi-
cient funding so as to guarantee every student an adequate educational
experience.
Tier 2 of the Foundation School Program provided a "guaranteed yield
system"" designed to allow school districts the chance to supplement
the basic education program at a level of its own choosing in accordance
with a chosen tax rate."' In other words, Tier 2 funding permits a school
district, if it so chooses, to tax at a rate above the statutorily mandated
level of $0.86 in order to provide supplemental, or additional, educational
programs and/or facilities." 2 Tier 2 financing is calculated as follows: for
every cent over the Tier 1 taxing level of $0.86 the state guaranteed a set
105. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727.
106. Id. (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.002(b) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2003).
This section of the code has since been amended to include as follows in section 42.101,
"For each student in average daily attendance, not including the time students spend each
day in special education programs in an instructional arrangement other than mainstream
or career and technology education programs, for which an additional allotment is made
under Subchapter C, a district is entitled to an allotment of $2,537. A greater amount for
any school year may be provided by appropriation." TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.101
(Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2003).
107. § 42.101.
108. § 42.101.
109. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727.
110. Id. at 728 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.301 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2003).
This section of the code has since been amended to be included in section 42.301, "The
purpose of the guaranteed yield component of the Foundation School Program is to pro-
vide each school district with the opportunity to provide the basic program and to supple-
ment that program at a level of its own choice. An allotment under this subchapter may be
used for any legal purpose other than capital outlay or debt service." TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 42.301 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2003).
111. § 42.301.
112. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 727-28.
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dollar amount that a school district could use to supplement its educa-
tional programs.1"3 For instance in 1995, this guaranteed funding was
capped at $0.64 worth of taxes beyond the Tier 1 tax level of $0.86, so as
to set a tax cap of $1.50 per $100 property valuation in a given district. 14
A school district may elect to receive supplemental funding over and be-
yond that necessary to provide an adequate education for every cent it
taxes over $0.86 and up to the capped level of $1.50.
In an attempt to remedy the then current two-tier system in Senate Bill
7, the legislature enacted one major change to the school finance system:
the new bill imposed a cap on allowable taxable property value per stu-
dent in a given school district.115 Specifically, the new bill created a limit
on a school district's allowable taxable property at $280,000 worth of
property per student.1 16 The Commissioner of Education reviews the tax
base of each district on an annual basis to determine if the district's taxa-
ble property value per student exceeds $280,000.117 If the $280,000 cap
was exceeded, the school district had five options it could take "to bring
its taxable property within the cap: (1) consolidation with another district;
(2) detachment of territory; (3) purchase of average daily attendance
credit; (4) contracting for the education of nonresident students; or (5)
tax base consolidation with another district.""' 8 Options (3) and (4) are
often referred to as the "Robin Hood Plan." 119
The Texas Supreme Court held that Senate Bill 7 met the constitutional
requirement of providing an efficient system.120 Justice Cornyn, writing
113. Id. at 728.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 728 (Tex.
1995).
117. Id.
118. Id.; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1996). Should a school district
fail to comply with the legislatively mandated cap by following one of the five prescribed
options, property from the district will be removed and annexed to another district.
§ 41.003; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.004(b) (Vernon 1996) ("If, before the dates pro-
vided by this subsection, a district notified under Subsection (a)(1) has not successfully
exercised one or more options under Section 41.003 that reduce the district's wealth per
student to a level equal to or less than the equalized wealth level, the commissioner shall
order the detachment of property from that district...").
119. See generally Roxanne D. Neloms, Comment, The Adventures in Robin Hood:
Are We There Yet? Texas' Bumpy Ride to Providing an Equal Education, 26 T. MARSHALL
L. REv. 221 (2001) (discussing the history of the Robin Hood Plan); Dyson, supra note 32,
at 7 (providing a general description of the Robin Hood Plan and the history of the Texas
school finance system); Kramer, supra note 47, at 1 (comparing school finance systems in
Texas, California, and Kentucky).
120. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 730; see TEX. CONST. art VII, § 1.
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for the majority, found that in the Edgewood I and II decisions the court
had held that the
[Texas] Constitution permits school districts to generate and spend
local taxes to enrich or supplement an efficient system, and that such
enrichment need not be equalized12' .... The [then] current system
remain[ed] unconstitutional not because any unequalized local sup-
plementation [was] employed, but because the State relie[d] heavily
on unequalized local funding in attempting to discharge its duty to
"make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an effi-
cient school system of public free schools. . . ." Once the Legislature
provides an efficient system in compliance with article VII, section 1
[of the Texas Constitution], it may, so long as efficiency is main-
tained, authorize local school districts to supplement their education
resources if local property owners approve an additional local prop-
erty tax.1
22
In other words, the court noted that the supplementation of funds
above an efficient educational system does not violate the Texas Consti-
tution, so long as the efficient school finance system provides the ade-
quate schooling to all students in the state as mandated by the
constitution. Justice Cornyn went on to find that in Senate Bill 7 the
legislature "equates the provision of a 'general diffusion of knowledge'
with the provision of an accredited education.' ' 123 In essence, the Court
found that so long as the funding provided to the school finance system
allows school districts to meet minimum adequacy requirements articu-
lated in the Education Code, the system is efficient for constitutional pur-
poses. In the Edgewood IV opinion, Justice Cornyn is adamantly
opposed to what he calls the "level-down" efficiency theory.1 24 The
"level-down" theory is the hypothesis that equality of education may
cause the overall quality of education within the Texas school system to
go down in the sack of meeting equality among all schools.1 25 The
strength of this theory has yet to be tested and the idea remains just that,
a theory. Unfortunately, Justice Cornyn does not heed his own advice in
opposing the "level-down" theory. His opinion seeks to water-down the
definition of an "efficient" educational system so as to hold Senate Bill 7
121. Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 729 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood If), 804 S.W.2d 491, 499 (Tex. 1991)).
122. Id. (citing Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 500).
123. Id. (arguing that "equity at all levels" theory of efficiency would result in the
"level[ing]-down" of quality of education provided by the public school system).
124. Id. at 730.
125. See generally id.
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constitutional at all costs, despite the effects on students in Texas for gen-
erations to come.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE TEXAS SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM -
WEST ORANGE-COVE CISD v. NEELEY
A. The District Court Decision
The school finance system endorsed by the majority of the Texas Su-
preme Court in the Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV)
decision withstood constitutional scrutiny until November 30, 2004, when
Judge Dietz, presiding judge for the 250th District Court for Travis
County, issued a final judgment holding that the current Texas school fi-
nance system is unconstitutional and must be fixed.'26 Judge Dietz made
the following findings regarding the school finance system: 127 (1) the sys-
tem violates Article VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution, because
it imposes "both a floor and a ceiling, denying school districts 'meaningful
discretion' in setting their tax rates"; 12s (2) the "finance system... vio-
lates the 'general diffusion of knowledge' clause... set forth in Article
VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution because the 'constitutional man-
date of adequacy exceeds the maximum amount of funding that is availa-
ble under... current funding formulas' ,;129 (3) the system is "inefficient,
inadequate and unsuitable" directly violating Article VII, section 1 of the
Texas Constitution; 3 ° and (4) "property-poor districts do not have sub-
stantially equal access to facilities funding" as is required under Article
VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. 3' The forthcoming sections of
Part 11-B will examine each of these findings in light of preceding
Edgewood decisions.
126. R.A. Dyer, Force of Oct. 1 Deadline Appears Open to Debate, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 14, 2005, at B7.
127. See Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No.
GV-100528, (250ih Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 30, 2004) (the case was originally
styled West Orange-Cove Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2003), at which
time the Texas Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs involved had sufficient standing
and viable claims to allow suit to continue after the case had been previously dismissed by
the trial court); see also Lonnie F. Hollingsworth, Jr., School Finance, TEXAS BAR JOUR-
NAL, (Jan. 2005) at 61.
128. Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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1. $1.50 Cap as a Floor and Ceiling in Violation of Article VIII,
Section 1-e
Article VIII, Section 1-e states that, "No State ad valorem taxes shall
be levied upon any property within this State."' 3 2 Note, however, that
local school districts use ad valorem taxes as their principal method of
funding.' 33 A plain reading of article VIII, Section 1-e shows that this
statute is only violated when the State of Texas attempts to issue or im-
plicitly direct an ad valorem tax.1
3 4
In Edgewood III, the Texas Supreme Court articulated the following
test in reviewing whether an ad valorem tax is in violation of Article VIII,
Section 1-e: "[an ad valorem tax is a state tax when it is imposed directly
by the State or when the State so completely controls the levy, assessment
and disbursement of revenue, either directly or indirectly, that the au-
thority employed is without meaningful discretion.' 135 In Edgewood IV,
the court warned that although the existing school finance system did not
constitute an unconstitutional ad valorem tax, it could be possible that
such a tax may be found unconstitutional in the future.' 3 6
Judge Dietz ruled that the current school finance system has created
both a floor and a ceiling by which school districts are deprived of any
meaningful discretion of what tax rates they wish to set. 137 The 250th
District Court found that because of the state imposed $1.50 cap, schools
are unable to continue to raise taxes in order to support the increasing
132. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e. An ad valorem tax is "[a] tax imposed proportion-
ally on the value of something (esp. real property), rather than on its quantity or some
other measure." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1183 (8th ed. 2004).
133. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tex.
2005) (noting that during the 2003-2004 school term the State of Texas supplied only thirty-
eight percent of school funds). Therefore, the majority of the remaining sixty-two percent
of educational funds were produced by local property taxes with minimal support provided
by the federal government. See id.
134. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e.
135. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.,
(Edgewood I1) 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex. 1992).
136. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 738 (Tex.
1995). The following language evidences the majority's concerns: "Eventually, some dis-
tricts may be forced to tax at the maximum allowable rate just to provide a general diffu-
sion of knowledge. If a cap on tax rates were to become in effect a floor as well as a
ceiling, the conclusion that the Legislature had set a statewide ad-valorem tax would ap-
pear to be unavoidable because the districts would then have lost all meaningful discretion
in setting the tax rate." Id.
137. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 30-31, Nos. 102-06, West Orange-
Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County,
Tex. Nov. 30, 2004); See also Terrence Stutz, School Finance and the Courts, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 5, 2005 at A2.
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cost of educating students. 3 ' In other words, the majority of Texas
schools are left taxing at the statutorily-mandated cap simply to provide a
minimum level of education to their students. In the 2003-2004 fiscal
year, approximately forty-eight percent of Texas school districts had tax
rates at the $1.50 statutorily prescribed cap. 139 These districts educate
precisely 2,332,465 students, or put differently, fifty-nine percent of the
total state student population. 140 If one includes schools within five cents
of the $1.50 cap, approximately eighty-one percent of students are in
school districts coming perilously close to losing all discretionary
authority.1 4 1
2. Article VII, Section 1 - General Diffusion of Knowledge Clause
Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides that, "A gen-
eral diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the lib-
erties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of
the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.""' 2 In Mumme
v. Marrs,1 4 3 the Supreme Court of Texas held that "it is the mandatory
duty of the Legislature to 'make suitable provision for the support and
maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.' "'a4 The court
must decide whether the legislature has effectively fulfilled its duty.145
Judge Dietz rejected the Edgewood IV opinion of the adequacy of the
general diffusion of knowledge that is essential under the Texas Constitu-
tion.'4 6 In Edgewood IV, the court found that since the Texas school fi-
nance System had made strides towards greater equality, it was thus
sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny."47 For instance, the court
noted that the disparity in property wealth per student had changed from
138. Findings of Fact at 31, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, at No. 104.
139. Id. at No. 105.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (emphasis added).
143. Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1931).
144. Id. at 36. In other words, the legislature has the duty of creating and implement-
ing the school finance system, whereas, the courts have the responsibility of ensuring that
the school finance system is permissible under the Texas Constitution. Id.
145. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 394
(Tex. 1989).
146. See generally Findings of Fact, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528.
147. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 730-31
(Tex. 1995) (noting that the situation has changed dramatically under the school finance
system implemented by Senate Bill 7).
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700-to-i, as seen during the Edgewood I decision, to an acceptable level
of 28-to-1 at the time of the Edgewood IV decision.'48
The opinion states that "to fulfill the constitutional obligation to pro-
vide a general diffusion of knowledge, districts must provide 'all Texas
children ... access to a quality education that enables them to achieve
their potential and fully participate now and in the future in the social,
economic, and educational opportunities of our state and nation."" 49
Judge Dietz found that the current school finance system does not permit
all school districts to give all children the necessary education to meet the
constitutional mandate described in Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas
Constitution.15 °
3. The Current School Finance System is Insufficient, Inadequate
and Unsuitable
Judge Dietz concluded that since the current school finance system
does not properly meet the general diffusion of knowledge requirement
proscribed by Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution, it is inade-
quate and must be amended.' 5 ' Specifically, the 250th District Court
found the growing needs of the Texas school system, like the education of
minority and economically disadvantaged students is not currently met by
the existing school funding structure.' 52 In order for the school finance
system to be efficient, it must satisfy the constitutional requirement of
disseminating a "general diffusion of knowledge."' 53 As mentioned pre-
viously, Judge Dietz found that the current school finance system fails to
disseminate a general diffusion of knowledge and is thus, ipso facto, inef-
ficient.' 4 An inefficient system provides an inadequate and unsuitable
education to the children of Texas. Accordingly, the current system is
148. Id.
149. Findings of Fact at 70, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, at No. 7 (quoting TEX.
EDUC. CODE Ar, N. § 4.001(a) (Vernon 1996)) (emphasis in original).
150. See generally id.
151. Id. at 72, Nos. 18-20; see Carlos Guerra, Will Judges Fix Problem Created by Polit-
ical Stubbornness, SAN AN-rONio EXPRESS NEWS, July 12, 2005 at B1; see Shorting Our
Schools; Education Bills Proposed in Austin Would Kill Robin Hood Without Providing
Adequate Alternative Funding to Meet Public Schools' Crying Needs, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Mar. 4, 2005, at B10.
152. Findings of Fact at 72, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, at Nos. 18-20; See also
id. at 26, No. 77 (stating that many of the accommodations made in the current school
finance system for school districts' varying needs are outdated).
153. TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1
154. Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-
100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 30, 2004).
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"insufficient, inadequate and unsuitable" under the Texas
Constitution. 155
4. Unequal Access to Facilities Funding
The Texas Constitution imposes the obligation upon the legislature to
provide an efficient educational system to all of its citizens.' 56 Included
within this obligation is to provide adequate facilities. In the Edgewood
IV decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that the state has a "duty to
provide all districts with substantially equal access to the operations and
facilities funding necessary for a general diffusion of knowledge."' 57
Judge Dietz concluded that property-poor districts lack necessary funds
to have "substantially equal access to funds for school facilities." 158 Spe-
cifically, the 250th District Court held that the Edgewood Intervenor Dis-
tricts' sub-standard conditions included "overcrowded school and
classrooms; out-of-date buildings, equipment and fixtures; inadequate li-
braries, science labs, cafeterias, gymnasiums, and other school facili-
ties."' 59 Accordingly, the current school finance system fails to provide
adequate facility financing, thus violating Article VII, Section 1 of the
Texas Constitution. The effects of inadequate facility funding on minority
students will be discussed later in this comment.
B. The Texas Supreme Court's Response
The Texas Supreme Court rendered its much anticipated decision on
November 22, 2005.16° The court noted that the case consisted of three
different groups challenging the constitutionality of the Texas School Fi-
nance System: (1) the plaintiffs; (2) the Edgewood intervenors; and (3)
155. Id.
156. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex.
1989).
157. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 746 (Tex.
1995) (citing Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d 391). The court also stated that, "[a]n efficient sys-
tem of public education requires not only classroom instruction, but also the classrooms
where that instruction is to take place." Id. at 726.
158. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 73, No. 298, West Orange-Cove Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov.
30, 2004).
159. Id. at 75, No. 307.
160. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.
2005); see also Robert T. Garrett & Christy Hoppe, School Finance Failure Produces Lots
of Blame Those Accused: School Districts, Business, Legislators Themselves, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 20, 2005, at A4 (noting the Texas Legislature's difficulty in amend-
ing the school finance system and the resignation that lawmakers were waiting for the
Texas Supreme Court to render its opinion before taking further action).
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the Alvarado intervenors. 161 The plaintiffs consisted of forty-seven
school districts that educated approximately twenty-five percent of Texas
students.162 This group claimed that local property taxes had, in effect,
become a statewide ad valorem tax prohibited by the Texas Constitu-
tion.163 The two intervenor groups educate an additional quarter of the
school children in Texas. 64 These two groups claimed that the Texas
school finance system failed to provide property-poor districts "substan-
tially equal access to education revenue."' 65 Finally, all three groups ar-
gued that the system is unable to achieve "a general diffusion of
knowledge" as mandated by the Texas Constitution, specifically found in
article VII, section 1.166
The Texas Supreme Court held that "local ad valorem taxes have be-
come a state property tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e.' 1 67 The
court agreed with the district court's finding that local school districts
have lost meaningful control over the applicable tax rate. However, the
court rejected the claims that property-poor districts were not receiving
substantially equal access to education revenue and that the current
school finance system failed to provide for a general diffusion of knowl-
edge.' 68 The court held that, while defects in the structure of the school
finance system leave it open to constitutional challenges, these defects in
structure are not currently enough to violate the Texas Constitution.' 69
Section B-II of this comment will explore the Supreme Court's holding in
greater depth.
1. Statewide Ad Valorem Tax
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Judge Dietz's decision and held
that local taxation for education has become so controlled by the state so
as to form a state property tax violating the Texas Constitution, specifi-
161. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d 746.
162. Id. at 751. Texas school currently education over 4.3 million children. Id.
163. Id.; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e.
164. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 751. The two intervenor groups are composed of 280
school districts across the state. Id.
165. Id. at 752.
166. Id.; see TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
167. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 754.
168. Id. at 794. "More money allocated under the present system would reduce some
of the existing disparities between districts but would at best only postpone the reform that
is necessary to make the system efficient. A Band-Aid will not suffice; the system itself
must be changed." Id. at 754 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I),
777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)).
169. Id. at 754 ("Pouring more money into the system may forestall those challenges,
but only for a time. They will repeat until the system is overhauled.").
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cally Article VIII, Section 1-e. 1 70 This provision of the Texas Constitu-
tion forbids the implementation of a statewide property tax. The court
has defined an ad valorem tax as "a state tax... when the State so com-
pletely controls the levy, assessment and disbursement of revenue, either
directly or indirectly, that the authority employed is without meaningful
discretion.' 17 1 Accordingly, the test used to determine whether the cur-
rent school finance system amounts to a statewide ad valorem tax is
whether school districts have any meaningful discretion in setting their
applicable local property tax rates.172
The court noted that "meaningful discretion" is not an exact term that
can be easily quantified. 73 School districts need not be absolutely forced
to tax at the statutorily proscribed cap limit to have lost meaningful dis-
cretion. 174 The state's effect on school district taxing must be measured
against a spectrum of possibilities.' 75 The court used the following lan-
guage from the Edgewood IV decision to describe when meaningful dis-
cretion has been lost:
[I]f the cost of providing for a general diffusion of knowledge contin-
ues to rise, as it surely will, the minimum rate at which a district must
tax will also rise. Eventually, some districts may be forced to tax at
the maximum allowable rates just to provide a general diffusion of
knowledge. If a cap on tax rates were to become in effect a floor as
well as a ceiling, the conclusion that the Legislature had set a state-
wide ad valorem tax would appear to be unavoidable because the
districts would then have lost all meaningful discretion in setting the
tax rate.17
6
170. Id. at 794 (noting that during the 1993-94 school term only two percent of dis-
tricts educating one percent of students were taxing at the $1.50 tax cap, while in 2003-2004
forty-eight percent of districts were taxing at the cap, educating fifty-nine percent of the
state's students).
171. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 795 (Tex.
2005) (citing Carrollton Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood 111), 826 S.W.2d 489, 502 (1989)).
172. Id. ("Each case must necessarily turn on its own particulars. Although parsing
the differences may be likened to dancing on the head of a pin, it is the Legislature, which
has created the pin, summoned the dancers, and called the tune. The Legislature can avoid
these constitutional conundra by choosing another path altogether." (citing Edgewood III,
826 S.W.2d at 503)).
173. Id. at 796.
174. Id. at 795-96. Disagreeing with the dissenting opinion by Justice Scott Brister
stating that "each and every district must prove it had no other choice," but to tax at a level
set by the State. Id. at 796.
175. Id. (citing Edgewood IlI, 826 S.W.2d at 503).
176. Neeley, 276 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno
(Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 738 (Tex. 1995)).
[Vol. 8:307
WHAT ABOUT OUR FUTURE
Therefore, the question was whether dissemination of a general diffu-
sion of knowledge required school districts to tax at rates near statutorily
proscribed taxes so as to have taken all meaningful discretion away from
these districts? The court noted that the number of districts taxing at the
$1.50 maintenance and operation tax cap has grown immensely since
1993.177 In 1993-1994 only two percent of districts were taxing at the
maximum rate.178 These districts educated approximately one percent of
Texas's student population. 179 Today, forty-eight percent of districts, edu-
cating fifty-nine percent of the state's student population, are taxing at
the $1.50 rate. 8 ° Additionally, another twelve percent of school districts
are taxing within $.05 of the $1.50 cap.181 The increased accreditation
demands, demographic changes of the student population, decrease in
qualified teachers, and increase of economically disadvantaged and lim-
ited English proficiency students have all added expense to the cost of
educating Texas students.18 2 These new expenses are forcing school dis-
tricts to tax at or near the $1.50 tax cap, causing them to lose meaning-
fully discretion. Accordingly, the Texas Supreme Court found that the
current school finance system under Senate Bill 7 acted as a prohibited,
statewide ad valorem tax.1 83
2. Article VII, Section 1 - Adequacy, Efficiency, and Suitability of
School Finance System
In the 1995 Edgewood IV decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that,
the school finance system created under Senate Bill 7 was constitutional;
however, it was "minimally acceptable only when viewed through the
prism of history."'" Since this time, the state has continued to fund less
and less the costs of education. Today, the state funds only thirty-eight
percent of education costs, down from forty-three percent in 1995.185 The
disparity of property value between property-rich school districts and
177. Id. at 794.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Additionally, another twelve percent of school districts are taxing within $.05
of the $1.50 cap. Id.
181. Neeley, 276 S.W.3d at 794.
182. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 796 (Tex.
2005).
183. Id. at 797 ("Accordingly, we conclude that the public school finance system vio-
lates article VIII, section 1-e the Texas Constitution.").
184. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 726 (Tex.
1995).
185. Neeley, 276 S.W.3d at 755 (citing Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 735). The current
state funding is at its lowest level in over half a century. Id.
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property-poor school districts remains 200-to-. 1 8 6 The Texas Supreme
Court has stated that, "a system that operates with an excess of resources
in some locales and a dearth of in others is inefficient., 18 7 Yet, the court
held that in spite of the evidence, the current school finance system is not
inefficient in violation of the Texas Constitution. 188
All three groups challenging the constitutionality of the school finance
system allege that the current system is not able to achieve "a general
diffusion of knowledge" as is mandated by article VII, section of the
Texas Constitution.189 Article VII, section 1 is to be judged by three cri-
teria: (1) whether or not the public school is efficient; (2) whether the
system is adequate to provide its pupils a general diffusion of knowledge;
and (3) whether the public education system is suitable.19 °
In analyzing these three criteria, the Supreme Court held that the
proper standard of review is arbitrariness. 191 In other words, the school
finance system will withstand constitutional scrutiny unless it is found to
be arbitrary and without guiding principle. "'[A] mere difference of
opinion [between judges and legislators], where reasonable minds could
differ, is not a sufficient basis for striking down legislation as arbitrary or
unreasonable.' 1 92 Article VII, Section 1 gives the legislature a great
deal of discretion as how to properly craft a public school system that
provides the required "general diffusion of knowledge."1 93 The legisla-
ture is not given complete free reign, but is permitted to determine both
186. Id. at 756.
187. Id. at 752 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d
391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
188. Neeley, 276 S.W.3d at 754.
189. Id. at 752; see also TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
190. Neeley, 276 S.W.3d at 752-53.
191. Id. at 783-84 (quoting Mumme v. Mars, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35-36 (Tex. 1931)) ("The
Legislature alone is to judge what means are necessary and appropriate for a purpose
which the Constitution makes legitimate. The legislative determination of the methods,
restrictions, and regulations is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen."). "An action is arbitrary when it is taken with reference to
guiding rules or principles." Id. at 784. The court noted that in its prior Edgewood deci-
sions it had not set out an explicit standard of review. Id. at 783. However, via its
Edgewood IV holding it had implicitly adopted the standard of arbitrariness. Id. at 784.
192. Id. at 785 (citing Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520
(Tex. 1995) (quoting Smith v. Davis, 426 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1968)); Sax v. Votteler, 648
S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1983)).
193. Id. at 784-85 ("[A]ssessing challenges to the public education system under arti-
cle VII, section 1, courts must not on the one hand substitute their policy choices for the
Legislature's, however undesirable the latter may appear, but must on the other hand ex-
amine the Legislature's choices carefully to determine whether those choices meet the re-
quirements of the Constitution. By steering this course, the Judiciary can assure that the
people's guarantees under the Constitution are protected without straying into the prerog-
atives of the Legislature.").
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what is necessary to accomplish the dissemination of a "general diffusion
of knowledge," and the proper means for providing this dissemination.194
So long as the legislatively created school finance system is created ac-
cording to "guiding rules and principles properly related to public educa-
tion... then the system" is not unconstitutional. 195
a. Adequacy
The court held that "the accomplishment of 'a general diffusion of
knowledge' is the standard by which the adequacy of the public education
system is to be judged." '196 Section 4.001(a) of the Texas Education Code
articulates the standard by which school districts are judged regarding the
dissemination of a "general diffusion of knowledge."' 97 Districts meet
this standard when they give students "meaningful opportunity to acquire
the essential knowledge and skills" set forth by the legislature. 98 The
Texas Supreme Court cautioned that the public school system does not
need to operate perfectly to give students of the state an adequate educa-
tion, but instead it need only provide students with reasonable accessibil-
ity and opportunity to meet the statutorily-proscribed criteria.' 99
The Texas Supreme Court ruled, after reviewing all the evidence
presented, it could not find that the current school finance system was
arbitrarily structured, or that school districts across the state were not
reasonably able to provide students access to a general diffusion of
knowledge. 2" The court acknowledged it was giving extreme deference
to the legislature, but held that this was the standard required by the
194. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 784-85
(Tex. 2005).
195. Id. at 785.
196. Id. at 787 (noting that the Texas Legislature has chosen school districts as the
method by which it disseminates a general diffusion of knowledge).
197. Id. (citing the district court, quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 4.001(a) (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) ("[AII Texas children... [must have] access to a quality educa-
tion that enables them to achieve their potential and fully participate now and in the future
in the social, economic, and educational opportunities of our state and nation." Id.)
198. Id. (citing the district court) (emphasis in original); See also TEX. EDUC. CODE
§ 28.001 (Vernon 1996) ("It is the intent of the legislature that the essential knowledge and
skills developed by the State Board of Education under this subchapter shall require all
students to demonstrate the knowledge and skills necessary to read, write, compute, prob-
lem solve, think critically, apply technology, and communicate across all subject areas. The
essential knowledge and skills shall also prepare and enable all students to continue to
learn in postsecondary educational, training, or employment settings.").
199. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 787 "An impending constitutional violation is not an ex-
isting one, and it remains to be seen whether the system's predicted drift toward constitu-
tional inadequacy will be avoided by legislative reaction to widespread calls for changes."
Id. at 790.
200. Id. at 789-90.
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Texas Constitution.2 0' Additionally, the court noted that there was ex-
tensive evidence that, without substantial change, the school finance sys-
tem would continue to drift toward inadequacy.202
b. Efficiency
"Article VII, section 1 [of the Texas Constitution] requires 'an efficient
system of free public schools."' 2 3 An efficient public school system re-
quires both efficiency in instruction and facilities.2°4 The court held that
efficiency does not require exact equality in spending, but instead "re-
quires substantially equivalent access to revenue only up to a point, after
which a community can elect higher taxes to 'supplement' and 'enrich' its
own schools., 20 5 In other words, once a school district has met the level
of "adequacy" it is free to elect to provide greater educational services.2°
These greater services need not be available to other districts at the same
tax effort. Thus, once a school district has reached "adequacy," an am-
biguous term at best, it is free to tax at greater rates even though other
school districts do not have the property wealth to match these efforts.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs and intervenors failed
to provide adequate evidence of the effects of unequal facilities fund-
ing.207 The defendants maintained that disparities in facilities funding is
not proof of inefficiency unless evidence is presented to show that all
school districts have similar needs.20 8 In other words, the disparity in
funding is justified by the differing needs of individual school districts.
The court concurred with this rationale and held that the plaintiffs and
intervenors failed to offer evidence demonstrating that school districts
are unable to offer a general diffusion of knowledge without more facili-
201. Id. at 790.
202. Id. ("There is substantial evidence, which again the district court credited, that
the public education system has reached the point where continued improvement will not
be possible absent significant change, whether that change take the form of increased fund-
ing, improved efficiencies, or better methods of education.").
203. Id.
204. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 790 (For an efficient system, "districts must have substan-
tially equal access to similar revenues per pupil at similar levels of tax effort.").
205. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 790-91
(Tex. 2005) ("[C]onstitutional efficiency does not require absolute equality of spending..
Id. at 790.).
206. Id. (holding that adequacy is the measure by which equality of spending must be
maintained, even though in the court's earlier Edgewood I decision it did not expressly
state that the point at which equality of spending may cease is that of adequacy).
207. Id. at 792.
208. Id. The State argued "that facilities needs vary widely depending on the size and
location of schools, construction expenses, and other variables." Id.
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ties.2 °9 In turn, the court found that the current school finance system
could not be said to be inefficient in violation of the Texas
Constitution. 1°
c. Suitability
The plaintiffs and intervenors claimed that the Texas school finance
system was unconstitutional because it was not suitable under Article
VII, Section I, due to insufficient funding.211 The suitability requirement
"refers specifically to the means chosen to achieve an adequate education
through an efficient system. '"212 The Texas Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the means used to fund the school finance system were ineffi-
cient because they relied too heavily on local property taxes. The court
held that, "neither the structure nor the operation of the funding system
prevents it from efficiently accomplishing a general diffusion of knowl-
edge., 21 3 So long as the state makes suitable means available to provide
for free public schools, it is irrelevant whether or not there is a heavy
reliance on local property taxes. The court noted that the heavy reliance
on local taxes makes it difficult, but not impossible, to maintain an effi-
cient public school system.214 Ultimately, the court found the means used
to fund the current school finance system sufficiently suitable to with-
stand constitutional challenge.215
C. Where the Texas Supreme Court Went Wrong
The Texas Supreme Court failed to address the true problem plaguing
the Texas school finance system: a lack of adequate funding to provide for
the constitutionally-mandated general diffusion of knowledge.216 In-
stead, the court chose to ignore school funding problems and to limit its
holding to the finding that the current school finance system has imposed
209. Id.
210. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 792. However, the court cautioned that, "the amount of
"supplementation" in the system cannot become so great that it, in effect, destroys the
efficiency of the entire system. The danger is that what the Legislature today considers to
be "supplementation" may tomorrow become necessary to satisfy the constitutional man-
date for a general diffusion of knowledge." Id.
211. Id. at 793.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 794. Additionally, the court noted, "the reliance on local revenue does not
prevent the system from providing a general diffusion of knowledge." Id.
214. Id.
215. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 794 ("We have suggested that these difficulties might be
avoided by fundamental changes in the structure of the system, but the possibility of im-
provement does not render the present system unsuitable for adequately and efficiently
providing a public education.").
216. See TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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an impermissible statewide ad valorem tax prohibited by Article VIII,
Section 1-e. 17 Instead of facing the real problem and providing a worka-
ble solution for Texas children, the court summarily held that the current
school finance system is adequate, efficient, and suitable. The court ap-
pears to have fallen prey to a problem that every first-year law student
must address when confronting final exams for the first time: the court
gives legal scholars the issues, the relevant law, and the facts surrounding
the situation, but fails to apply this law to the relevant facts to articulate a
well-reasoned answer to the legal issues at hand.
To understand the incongruity between the courts reasoning and con-
clusion one need look no further than the following language from its
decision:
[T]here is much evidence... that many schools and districts are strug-
gling to teach an increasingly demanding curriculum to a population
with a growing number of disadvantage students, yet without addi-
tional funding needed to meet these challenges. There are wide gaps
in performance among student groups differentiated by race, profi-
ciency in English, and economic advantage. Non-completion and
dropout rates are high, and the loss of students who are struggling
may make performance measures applied to those who continue ap-
pear better than they should. The rate of students meeting college
preparedness standards is very low. There is also evidence of high
attrition and turnover among teachers statewide, due to increasing
demands and stagnant compensation.218
Despite this multitude of deficiencies the court acknowledges Texas
schools are facing, two sentences later it holds that the current system
cannot be found so arbitrary as to violate the Texas constitution.219 This
begs the question, what, if anything, can reach this momentous standard
of arbitrariness the court mandates? As noted supra,2 ° the court ex-
plains that an action is arbitrary when it is taken without reference to
guiding rules or principles. The primary principle of pubic education as
articulated by the Texas Constitution is to disseminate a "general diffu-
sion of knowledge.",22' As evidenced by the court's own language as
217. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 789, 794
(Tex. 2005).
218. Id. at 789.
219. Id. at 789-90 ("Having carefully reviewed the evidence and the district court's
findings, we cannot conclude that the Legislature has acted arbitrarily in structuring and
funding the public education system so that school districts are not reasonably able to
afford all students the access to education and the educational opportunity to accomplish a
general diffusion of knowledge.").
220. See Supra, Footnotes 190-91.
221. See TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
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quoted above, the current school finance system fails to meet this stan-
dard. How is a school system, that funds itself primarily from local prop-
erty taxes, adequately funded when there remains a 200-to-1 disparity of
property values between property-rich and property-poor districts? 222
The question is how far must the citizens of Texas go before we drift
toward inefficiency? The Court provides no answer to this question but
merely concludes that we are not there yet. The court notes that heavy
reliance on local taxes, given the diversity of school districts, makes it
challenging to have an efficient school system.22 3 It even goes so far as to
say that many of the school finance system's current problems could be
avoided by fundamental structural improvements to the system.22 4 How-
ever, the court does not articulate what these structural improvements
encompass. Instead, the court tritely holds that the possibility of im-
provement is not sufficient to find the current system as inadequate, inef-
ficient, or unsuitable.
The court does not make the slightest effort to articulate how or when
the Texas School Finance System may become inadequate, inefficient, or
unsuitable. Nor does the court explain what structural changes could im-
prove the current system. Instead, the court chose to stay inactive on the
sideline and made no effort towards achieving education equality
throughout the State of Texas as is required by Article VII, Section 1.
IV. EFFECTS OF INADEQUATE FUNDING ON ECONOMICALLY
DISADVANTAGED & MINORITY STUDENTS
The West-Orange Cove v. Neeley decision makes it clear that the cur-
rent school finance system is inadequate to meet Texas's current and fu-
ture educational funding needs. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, Judge Dietz explores a variety of problems facing the system and
the effect these problems could have on the State of Texas in the upcom-
225ing years. This portion of the comment will explore Judge Dietz's con-
cerns and the general effects inadequate school funding has on
economically disadvantaged and minority students.
A. The Demographic Change in Texas' Student Population
The Texas school system has been growing rapidly in recent years. For
instance, in the 1990s, the school population grew by 3.9 million students,
222. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 756.
223. Id. at 794.
224. Id.
225. See generally Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, West Orange-Cove Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov.
30, 2004).
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or by nearly twenty-three percent. 26 This increased enrollment has
forced school districts to use even greater resources on new facilities,
teachers, and administrative staff.22 7 Since 1990, the Texas school system
has been adding, on average, 72,500 students per year.2 Accompanying
this large influx of new students is a general demographic transition in the
Texas student population.229 Almost all of the student growth has come
from the minority and low socio-economic income populations.2 3 °
Generally, Limited English Proficient (LEP) and economically disad-
vantaged students cost more to educate than other students.23 a Thus, the
changing demographic make up of the Texas student population is result-
ing in substantially greater costs for school districts which are not ade-
quately compensated under the current school finance system. 232
Property-poor school districts are the districts that have the most difficult
time raising sufficient money to adequately support their student body
populations. Consequently, property-poor school districts that often tax
at higher rates have substandard schools.233 Generally, these inferior
schools consist of largely minority student populations.2 34 Therefore, mi-
nority and economically disadvantaged students are often forced to at-
tend inferior schools in property-poor districts.
Property-poor school districts consist of mainly minority and economi-
cally disadvantaged children that are in need of greater funding than stu-
dents educated in property-rich school districts. "School funding experts
generally agree that high-poverty schools need more resources to meet
226. Id. at 22, No. 65.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 22, No. 66. During 2002-2003 school term the enrollment of the Texas
school system had grown to 4,259,864. Id.
229. Id. at 23, No. 67 ("Texas students have become-and will continue to become-
more ethnically diverse, more likely to be from households with incomes below the poverty
line, and more likely to require additional instruction in order to become fluent in
English.").
230. Findings of Fact at 23, West Orange-Cove, GV-100528, at No. 68. African-Ameri-
can and Hispanic students make up ninety-seven percent of the enrollment growth. Id.
Additionally, ninety percent of these added students come from low-income families. Id.
231. Id. at 23, No. 67.
232. Id. ("[C]hanging demographics have resulted in significantly higher costs for
school districts that are not compensated adequately through school finance formulas, be-
cause of the insufficiency of the basic allotment and/or the compensatory education and
bilingual weights.").
233. See generally Debra L. Ireland, Comment, The Price of Education: What Local
Control is Costing American Children, 6 SCHOLAR 159, 170 (2003) (discussing the disparity
between schools of property-rich areas and property-poor areas).
234. Id. at 170-71 (citing Judith A. Winston, Achieving Excellence and Equal Opportu-
nity in Education: No Conflict of Laws, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2001)).
[Vol. 8:307
WHAT ABOUT OUR FUTURE
the same standards [as low-poverty schools]. 2 35 Financially struggling
districts are more likely to be urban and composed of predominantly mi-
nority and poor students, whose costs of education will often be higher
due to the more extensive needs of these students as compared to those
educated in property-rich districts. 236 "More remedial education classes,
and therefore special education teachers, are likely to be required, and a
greater portion of [these school districts'] total budget[s] will likely be
needed simply to maintain older, less efficient facilities., 237 According to
Judge Dietz,
[I]f existing gaps between Whites and other minorities in educational
attainment levels and household income remain in place, Texas will
"have a population that not only will be poorer, less well educated,
and more in need of numerous forms of state services than its pre-
sent population but also less able to support such services. It is likely
to be less competitive in the increasingly international labor and
other markets.
238
B. The Increased Legislatively Imposed Accountability Standards
Another factor affecting the level of funding needed to provide stu-
dents an efficient diffusion of knowledge is the recent increase in ac-
countability standards imposed by the Texas Legislature. Recently, the
legislature significantly modified the school accountability regime without
providing increased funding to allow schools to meet these new higher
standards.239 For example, in July 2000, the State Board of Education
implemented changes increasing requirements for high school gradua-
tion.24° The new "mandatory enrichment curriculum includes courses in
the following areas: (1) foreign languages; (2) health; (3) physical educa-
235. KEVIN CAREY, THE EDUCATION TRUST, THE FUNDING GAP 2004, MANY STATES
STILL SHORTCHANGE LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 2 (2005), available at http://
www2.edtrust.org/NR/rdonlyres/30B3ClB3-3DA6-4809-AFB9-2DAACF11CF88/0/funding
2004.pdf.
236. Ireland, supra note 233, at 170-71 (citing Winston, supra note 234, at 1006).
237. Id. at 172 (citing JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 37-38 (1991); Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educa-
tional Opportunity, 14 J.L. POL'Y 483, 486-87, 512, 514 (1998).
238. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 23, No. 70, West Orange-Cove Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov.
30, 2004) (citing STEVE H. MURDOCK ET AL., THE NEW TEXAS POPULATION CHANGE AND
THE FUTURE OF TEXAS 224 (2003)).
239. Id. at 17, No. 43 ("These changes have vastly increased school districts' budget-
ary pressures... as they now must now prepare for a more rigorous assessment on a
broader curriculum.").
240. Id. at 17, No. 44 (citing 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 74.12 (2000)).
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tion; (4) fine arts; (5) economics; (6) career and technology education;
and (7) technology applications." ' 1 Additionally, in 2003 the legislature
implemented a new standardized test, the Texas Assessment of Knowl-
edge and Skills (TAKS).2 42 This test is far more difficult than the previ-
ous Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) test.243
Judge Dietz concluded that, "[tlhe Legislature made these changes to
the accountability regime without ascertaining how much it would cost
for school districts to implement these changes or whether they had the
funding capacity to do So. ' '244 As then Lieutenant Governor Ratliff
stated, by implementing these increased standards without providing any
additional funding, the legislature was asking school districts to "make
brick(s) without straw., 245 For example, "since 1995 alone, more than 60
unfunded or partially funded mandates have been imposed on school dis-
tricts. '24 6 These more rigorous mandates have not been coupled with in-
creased funding, thus increasing the likelihood that property-poor
districts will not be able to meet the new requirements. Accordingly,
property-poor districts, whose population is dominated by minority and
economically disadvantaged students, will continue to struggle to provide
an adequate education to its students.
C. Inadequate School Facilities Funding
Perhaps the greatest area of need for minority and economically disad-
vantage students, in regard to overall school funding, is the need for more
funding for adequate facilities. "The property-poor [districts] lack ade-
quate funds for, and do not have substantially equal access to funds for
school facilities, and therefore do not have all the facilities essential to
provide students a learning environment in which to attain a suitable and
adequate education." '47 Judge Dietz held, "property-poor districts do
not have substantially equal access to facilities funding in violation of the
efficiency and suitability provisions of article VII § 1 of the Texas
Constitution. "248
241. Id. at 17, No. 45; see also 19 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 74.3 (2000).
242. Findings of Fact at 17, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, No. 46.
243. Id. ("[T]he TAKS test is widely considered to be a much more rigorous test.
Indeed, both Plaintiff and State witnesses testified that, as a result of the transition from
TAAS to TAKS, the bar had been raised considerably.").
244. Id. at 18-19, No. 50.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 19, No. 52. According to then Lieutenant Governor Ratliff, this increase in
mandates occurred even though this was contrary to legislative intent. Id.
247. Findings of Fact at 73, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, No. 298.
248. Id. at 122, No. 23.
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The State of Texas makes it very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness
of school facilities funding because the state does not keep records re-
garding school districts' facilities.249 However, it is apparent that "Texas
has long had substantial unmet school facilit[y] needs., 250 A report is-
sued in 2000 by the National Education Association approximated that
Texas's schools had nearly $13.7 billion in unmet school facilities needs,
$9.5 billion for infrastructure and $4.2 billion for education technology.251
Likewise, the United States General Accounting Office "found that 76.3
percent of Texas schools reported" that additional funds were needed in
order to update schools to be in good condition.25 2 "School facilities
have an impact on student achievement and teacher satisfaction and ef-
fectiveness., 253 Texas statutory law requires an "adequacy of school facil-
ities. '' 214  "Inadequate school facilities deprive students of an equal
opportunity to meet state-defined standards and obtain a constitutionally
adequate education., 255 The parties challenging the constitutionality of
the current school finance system, as applied to facility funding, are from
predominantly property-poor districts. 6 As noted supra,25 7 property-
poor districts are generally composed of student populations predomi-
nantly made up of minority and economically disadvantaged students.258
249. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 74, No. 299, West Orange-Cove Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov.
30, 2004). "When asked if there were any estimates of the cost of bringing school facilities
up to the standards adopted by the commissioner of education, Joe Wisnoski, Deputy As-
sociate Commissioner for School Finance and Fiscal Analysis, testified: 'I don't know that
anyone has assessed what would be needed to that, if anything. There may be estimates for
individual schools, but I don't know of anything done statewide."' Id.
250. Id. at 74, No. 300.
251. Id. at 74, No. 305 (citing NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, Modernizing Our Schools: What
Will It Cost? (2000)).
252. Id. at 74, No. 301 (citing HEALTH, EDUC. & HUMAN SERVS. DIVISION, U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL'N No. 96-103, SCHOOL FACILITIES: AMERICA'S SCHOOLS RE-
PORT DIFFERING CONDITIONS 68 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96
103.pdf.).
253. Id. at 79, No. 339.
254. Findings of Fact at 80, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528, No. 344 (quoting TEX.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 46.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)). "The standards must include re-
quirements related to space, educational adequacy, and construction quality." TEX. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 46.008 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
255. Id. at 82, No. 368.
256. Id. at 6, No. 2. "[T]he Legislature has defined the purpose of the school finance
system as being to guarantee that school districts have sufficient access to funding to pro-
vide a basic program that meets accountability/accreditation requirements... that provides
substantially equal access to funds for an enriched program, and that includes a facilities
program." Id. at 45, No. 9.
257. See Supra, Footnotes 229-32.
258. Ireland, supra note 233, at 171 (citing Winston, supra note 233, at 1006).
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Therefore, minority and economically disadvantaged students are suffer-
ing from the state's failure to properly fund needed school facilities.
The current school finance system fails to provide adequate funding to
meet increasingly more rigorous accountability standards, does not pro-
vide substantially equal access to funds for enrichment programs, and
does not allow for equalized facilities financing. Minority and economi-
cally disadvantaged students are left to suffer the brunt of this unconstitu-
tional and inequitable school finance system.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO Fix THE SCHOOL FINANCE DILEMMA
It is clear that the current Texas school finance system is unconstitu-
tional and does not provide adequate funding to allow school districts to
disseminate a general diffusion of knowledge. Additionally, we know
that the current system does not allow for equitable funding of school
facilities. The question is: what can the legislature do to amend the cur-
rent system so as to be constitutional while providing equal access to ade-
quate funds to educate all children in the state of Texas? This portion of
the comment will explore possible solutions to effectuate a constitution-
ally viable education system.
A. Consolidation of School Districts
There are currently over one thousand school districts throughout the
State of Texas.259 In 1993, shortly before the enactment of Senate Bill 7,
then Speaker of the House Gib Lewis supported a plan to consolidate
various school districts.26 ° Lewis's plan called for the consolidation of the
school districts into 188 mega-districts.26' In 1993, this plan was esti-
mated to save the state $422 million annually by lowering administrative
costs. 2 62 Thus, this plan would lower administrative costs while putting
more money into the state school finance system.263 This would help to
259. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 562 (Tex.
2003); see also Henry Cuellar, Considerations in Drafting a Constitutional School Finance
Plan: A Legislator's Perspective, 19 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 83, 93 (1993).
260. Cuellar, supra note 259, at 94. The districts were to be drawn largely by county
line. Id. at 93. Each of these county districts was to be governed by a school board. Id. at
94.
261. Id. at 93.
262. Id. at 94.
263. Christopher Ramos, The Educational Legacy or Racially Restrictive Covenants:
Their Long Term Impact on Mexican Americans, 4 SCHOLAR 149, 173-83 (2001) (discussing
how racially restrictive covenants separated Mexican-Americans from the rest of the popu-
lation in San Antonio, Texas).
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remove some of the burden the current system places on local property
taxes and allow for more equalized funding.264
In reviewing any school finance proposal, it is imperative to understand
the importance Texas and its residents put on local control of schools.
Since the writing of the Texas Constitution, the state has put great value
in allowing local communities to have control over the education pro-
cess.26 5 This proposal would require a legislative enactment proscribing
the consolidation of the numerous school districts across the state. How-
ever, Lewis's "proposal received very little support from both legislators
and educators" when first formulated in 1993.266 Accordingly, it would
seem unlikely that the legislature would choose to take this route to in-
crease school funding. However, since the plan's initial proposal in 1993,
the Texas school finance system has continued to struggle towards equal-
ity of funding. Therefore, the legislature may be more willing to consider
school district consolidation when taking into effect the uncertainty of the
current political climate.
B. Constitutional Amendment to Allow for a State-Wide Ad Valorem
Tax
Another possible solution would be to allow total state control over
school funding. This could be achieved via an amendment to Article
VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution, so as to no longer forbid the
levying of a state-wide ad valorem tax. Essentially, the legislature would
set a state property tax that would be distributed on a per-student basis
equally to all school districts across Texas.
A state-wide ad valorem tax would prevent the majority of the litiga-
tion involving the Texas school finance system.2 67 A state-mandated
property tax would take away taxing discretion from local districts, thus,
ending the argument that a state taxing cap establishes both a floor and a
ceiling to the amount of funding available to a given school district. In
other words, the state would set a proscribed tax rate and there would be
no discretion invested in local school districts. Theoretically, the state
would not have restrictions on the tax rate it may charge property own-
ers. Additionally, since all funds would be distributed equally on a per-
264. Cuellar, supra note 259, at 94.
265. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 757 (Tex.
2005) (noting that the State justifies the large number of school districts on the public
policy of local control). Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court discusses the fact that
almost all of the delegates to the Texas Constitutional Convention were in favor of locally
controlled schools. Id. at 785-86.
266. Cuellar, supra note 259, at 94.
267. Id. (noting that the major disadvantage to this program would be the heavy cost
associated with its administration).
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student basis, each school would receive equal dollars to educate
students.
However, there are two major disadvantages to this proposal: (1) the
high administrative costs required to operate a statewide school finance
system, and (2) the taking away of local, discretionary control from
school districts. Historically, Texas school funding has been predomi-
nantly funded by local taxes.268 Thus, Texans may be hesitant to give up
local control over their schools' and children's education.
C. Constitutional Amendment Permitting the Formation of County
Education Districts (CEDs)
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the creation of County Educa-
tion Districts (CEDs), whose sole responsibility is to levy and collect
taxes without discretionary control over the tax rate to be charged, are a
de facto state-wide ad valorem tax. 6 9 In effect, the creation of CEDs is
the combination of consolidating school districts and creating a state
maintained ad valorem tax. In order to effectuate more adequate fund-
ing to all students across Texas, the legislature may choose to implement
a constitutional amendment permitting the creation of CEDs - in effect
overruling the Edgewood III decision. This solution, like those men-
tioned before, may face stiff resistance because it would require residents
to relinquish some local control of school financing.
D. Constitutional Amendment Limiting Court Intervention
In several legislative sessions, a constitutional amendment has been
proposed "that would restrict the power of courts to consider legal ac-
tions relating to school finance. The proposed amendment would man-
date that the legislature would have sole discretion to determine the
public school finance issue.",270 This proposal was led by John Culberson,
a Republican in the Texas House of Representatives.27' The proposal
garnered fifty-seven votes in the House of Representatives when origi-
nally suggested in the early 1990s. 272 However, it was soundly criticized
by Democratic members of the Texas Legislature as a "breach of the sep-
268. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood Ii), 826 S.W.2d 489, 494-97 (1992).
269. See generally id.. (holding that a lack of discretionary control is the main charac-
teristic of an ad valorem tax).
270. Cuellar, supra note 259, at 94 (noting that this proposal received minimal support
in the State Senate, but gained a "good number" of votes in the House).
271. Farr & Trachtenberg, supra note 4, at 674 (citing Cindy Rugely & Melanie Mark-
ley, Though Narrower, School Funding Gap Still Chasm, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 27, 1992,
at Statel).
272. Id. (citing Rugely & Markley, supra note 271, at Statel).
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aration of powers doctrine," and failed to gain widespread support.273
This solution would do little to improve the Texas school finance system,
but would instead simply limit the judiciary branch from policing the leg-
islature's attempts toward fulfilling the constitutional mandate of provid-
ing an "efficient" school system. Nonetheless, this proposal may not be
completely ignored given the fact that it has received at least limited sup-
port in the past. As the legislature has an increasingly difficult time draft-
ing a school finance system that will withstand constitutional challenge, a
proposed amendment to limit judicial interaction will become increas-
ingly more attractive.
E. Implementation of a State Income Tax
A final solution proposed by some proponents of adequate school fi-
nance funding is the implementation of a state income tax.274 This pro-
gram would allow the school system to receive greater funding from the
state thereby reducing the pressure on local school districts to continue to
increase property taxes. Currently, the state funds approximately thirty-
eight percent of annual public education costs. 275 This is down from the
forty-three percent state funding as discussed in the Edgewood IV deci-
sion in 1995.276 Accordingly, the state continues to shoulder less and less
of the burden of educating Texas children. In turn, this burden is forced
upon local taxpayers by virtue of higher property taxes.
The groundwork for the creation of a state income tax was first laid by
then Lieutenant Governor Bob Bullock in 1993.277 At this time, Texas
voters approved a constitutional amendment, the Bullock Amendment,
that allows for the implementation of a state income tax.27 8 The amend-
ment states that a bill initiating a personal income tax may only take ef-
273. Id. at 607 (citing Rugely & Markley, supra note 271, at Statel).
274. Bruce Davidson, Texas Kids Need State Income Tax, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS
NEWS, July 24, 2005, at H2 (arguing that the only way to adequately funding public schools
is through a state income tax).
275. Neely v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tex.
2005).
276. Id.; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 735
(Tex. 1995).
277. DICK LAVINE & F. SCoTT McCowN, CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE
BEST CHOICE FOR A PROSPEROUS TEXAS: A TExAs-STYLE PERSONAL INCOME TAX 5
(2005), http://www.cppp.org/files/7/prosperoustexas.pdf; see Janet Elliott & R.G. Ratcliffe,
Perry argues Senate's plan will not pass; The proposed business taxes will be difficult to get
past the House and the governor, HouSTON CHRON., June 9, 2005, at B4 (noting that for the
first time since the passage of .the Bullock Amendment in 1993 the Legislature is actively
considering the viability of implementing a state personal income tax).
278. LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5.
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fect after voters approve the legislation by statewide referendum. 79 In
addition, the amendment also regulates how the state may spend the
money raised by the income tax: two-thirds of the money must be used to
reduce property taxes, and the remaining one-third must be used to fi-
nance public schools.28 ° The Bullock Amendment is now contained in
Article VIII, Section 24 of the Texas Constitution.
A state income tax would reduce property taxes and provide more
school funding.281 If a state income tax is implemented by referendum,
two-thirds of the money received by the government would be used to
reduce property taxes.282 It is estimated that this funding would enable
school districts, now taxing property at the highest allowable level of
$1.50 per $100 of property valuation, to drop their tax rates to approxi-
mately $.50 per $100 of property value.2 83 Additionally, the remaining
one-third of the income tax revenue received would go directly to in-
crease school funding.
2 84
Furthermore, state income tax payments are deductible from federal
income taxes. 285 Thus, any income tax paid to the State of Texas would
be directly deducted from the federal taxes paid by Texas residents. This
has the effect of shifting part of the property tax and school finance bur-
den on to the federal government by allowing money that would previ-
ously have gone to the federal government to be retained by the State of
279. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24.
280. LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24(f) ("In
the first year in which a tax described by Subsection (a) is imposed and during the first year
of any increase in the tax that is subject to Subsection (b) of this section, not less than two-
thirds of all net revenues remaining after payment of all refunds allowed by law and ex-
penses of collection from the tax shall be used to reduce the rate of ad valorem mainte-
nance and operation taxes levied for the support of primary and secondary public
education. In subsequent years, not less than two-thirds of all net revenues from the tax
shall be used to continue such ad valorem tax relief."); see also TEX. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 24(g) ("The net revenues remaining after the dedication of money from the tax under
Subsection (f) of this section shall be used for support of education, subject to legislative
appropriation, allocation, and direction.").
281. See LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5; see TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24
(mandating that the implementation of a state income tax must go towards reductions in
property taxes and education cots).
282. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 24(f).
283. LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5. This study argues that if Texas imple-
mented a state income tax similar with rates ranging from 3% - 6.45%, it could raise an
additional $5.5 billion per year in educational funding. Id. Additionally, this income tax
would produce $10.9 billion in property tax reductions, allowing average maintenance and
operations school taxes to go below $1.00 per $100 of property valuation. Id.
284. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24.
285. Shannon Buggs, Deduction for sales tax: the Downside, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
25, 2004, Business 1 (discussing the possibility of allowing a deduction of state sales tax
from an individual's federal income taxes).
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Texas.28 6 For example, if Texas were to implement a three percent state
income tax, the taxpayer would be allowed to deduct this three percent
from his or her gross federal income when computing his or her federal
personal income taxes. In effect, this enables the State of Texas to retain
a percentage of income that would have previously been lost to the fed-
eral government.2 " The resident is merely paying the State of Texas,
rather than the federal government, what would already be owed under
the current tax structure. The federal government is losing the revenue
that would be retained by the State.
The adoption of a state income tax has been met with steep opposi-
tion.288 Many wary politicians from both the Republican and Democratic
parties refuse to even suggest the issue.28 9 For instance, Chris Bell, a
Democratic candidate for Governor of Texas, stated that the idea of an
income tax was off the table because he does not believe it to be a realis-
tic goal: "[P]eople are not going to vote to implement an income tax.",29
0
However, in a 2005 telephone survey, forty-five percent supported the
adoption of a state income tax, while forty-eight percent are opposed to
an income tax, and eight percent are unsure.291 Accordingly, it appears
that the issue of implementing a state income tax is not as heavily op-
posed as many legislators think.
In sum, the adoption of state income tax requires a statewide referen-
dum adopting the tax.292 Two-thirds of the tax must be used to reduce
property taxes and the remaining one-third must be used to fund public
education.293 A state income tax would allow for a significant reduction
in property taxes while putting more money into the school finance sys-
286. LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5.
287. Id. This study notes that if Texas implemented a state income tax with rates
ranging from 3% - 6.45%, it would receive an additional $16.4 billion in funding annually.
Id. The federal government via the deduction of the state income tax from the federal
income tax would subsidize ten percent or $1.6 billion of this funding. Id.
288. Davidson, supra note 274, at H2 (stating that "supporting a state income tax is an
unpardonable sin in conservative political circles in the Lone Star State." Additionally,
noting that, "a politician might as well have the words 'liberal scum' tattooed on his fore-
head if he openly supports an income tax in Texas.").
289. See generally Rebeca Chapa, Timing is Everything on School Funds, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 24, 2005, at Al (discussing the stigma politicians face when
proposing new tax hikes).
290. R.G. Ratcliffe, Bell Sees School Funding as Path to Governor's Seat, HoUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 9, 2005, at B1.
291. Clay Robison, More Texans Say They Favor Sharing the Wealth; An Income Tax,
Other Proposals Draw Responses Along Party Lines, HoUSTON CHRON., Sept. 11, 2005, at
B3 (noting that the poll was conducted by Scripps Research Center and had a margin of
error of plus or minus three percentage points).
292. See Elliott & Ratcliffe, supra note 277, at B4.
293. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 24.
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tem. Additionally, part of the state income tax would be subsidized by
the federal government because the state income tax charged to Texans
would be reduced from the residents' federal income tax bill.2 94
VI. CONCLUSION
The Texas school finance system has undergone several decades of con-
tinuous constitutional challenges. The initial phase of litigation centered
upon federal equal protection claims. However, the United States Su-
preme Court held that education was not a fundamental right and thus
applied the rational basis test to find the then-existing Texas school fi-
nance system to be constitutional.295
Subsequently, a long line of state constitutional challenges were initi-
ated. These cases are generally referred to as the Edgewood decisions. 296
The Edgewood decisions challenged the fairness of the way the school
finance system was funded as well as the practical effects that these fund-
ing mechanisms had on school districts across the state. It was repeatedly
shown that property-rich school districts were able to provide greater re-
sources to their children than property-poor school districts. Addition-
ally, the $1.50 tax cap imposed on local property taxes amounted to both
a floor and a ceiling on variable tax rates in many districts across the
state. This tax cap acted to create what, in effect, became a constitution-
ally-prohibited, state-wide ad valorem tax. In turn the Texas Legislature
responded with a number of new school financing mechanisms. How-
ever, these mechanisms failed in large part to constitutionally correct the
inequality existing in the Texas school finance system.
The most recent challenge to the Texas school finance system is the
Neely v. West Orange-Cove ISD decision. At the District Court Level
Judge Dietz found the current school finance system to be unconstitu-
tional.297 Dietz held that the current school finance system violated Arti-
cle VIII, Section 1-e of the Texas Constitution by implementing an
impermissible statewide ad valorem tax. Additionally, the court found
that the "finance system violates the 'general diffusion of knowledge'
clause.., set forth in Article [sic] VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution
because the constitutional mandate of adequacy exceeds the maximum
294. See LAVINE & McCowN, supra note 277, at 5.
295. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
296. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.
1995); Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood III), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood II), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby
(Edgewood 1), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
297. Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-
100528 (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov. 30 2004).
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amount of funding that is available under. . . current funding formu-
las.",298 The court held that the system is "inefficient, inadequate and un-
suitable," directly violating the Texas Constitution, and that property-
poor school districts do not have substantially equal access to facilities
funding.299 The court held that, "the current funding capacity of the
Texas school finance system fails to provide Intervenor districts [made up
of predominately minority and economically disadvantaged student
populations] with sufficient access to revenue to provide for a general
diffusion of knowledge to their students."3"
On November 22, 2005 the Texas Supreme delivered its much antici-
pated decision in Neely v. West-Orange Cove CISD.3 °1 The court held
that the current school finance system created under Senate Bill 7 was
unconstitutional because it imposed a de facto statewide ad valorem tax
in violation of Article VIII, Section 1-e.30 2 However, contrary to Judge
Dietz's finding at the district court level, the Texas Supreme Court found
that school districts throughout the state were receiving substantially
equal access to education revenue and that the system was capable of
providing a general diffusion of knowledge.3 °3 The Supreme Court sum-
marily held that the current school finance system is adequate, efficient,
and suitable to provide for the statutorily-proscribed level of educa-
tion.3 ° 4 Throughout the court's opinion it discussed that there are flaws
in the current system and it may become unconstitutional under Article
VII, Section 1 should the legislature not make fundamental changes in
the system.3 °5 However, the court was unwilling to hold that the current
school finance system does not provide sufficient funding to provide for a
"general diffusion of knowledge." Thus, despite the overwhelming evi-
dence showing inequality in access and education opportunity, the court
choose to ignore the plight of many children throughout the State of
Texas.
Both the Texas Legislature's and Texas Supreme Court's reluctance to
address the issue of school finance reform begs the question, what can be
done to correct the current school finance system? In section V - Pro-
posed Solutions, this comment outlines five possible resolutions to cor-
rect the Texas school finance system: (1) consolidation of the over 1,000
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex.
2005).
302. Id. at 754.
303. Id. at 789-90.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 790.
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school districts across the State; (2) a constitutional amendment allowing
for the imposition of a state-wide ad valorem tax; (3) a constitutional
amendment permitting the creation of County Education Districts; (4) a
constitutional amendment forbidding judicial oversight of the school fi-
nance system; and (5) a constitutional amendment allowing for the imple-
mentation of a state income tax. Additionally, there is a sixth option that
seems to have been endorsed by the Texas Legislature; that is doing noth-
ing, instead hoping that the court system will remedy the problem. Thus,
the state education system is currently at an impasse with neither the leg-
islature nor the court system willing to create a constitutional school fi-
nance system that will provide necessary funds to education the children
of Texas.
After extensive research, it has become abundantly clear that the cur-
rent Texas school finance system is grossly underfunded. Additionally,
the system continues to be composed of the "haves and have-nots." The
system is too dependent on local property taxes. It is imperative that a
new school finance system must be created to equitably distribute funds
throughout the state to all school districts on a dollar-per-dollar basis.
The citizens of Texas can no longer permit the adequacy of a child's edu-
cation to depend on what zipcode he or she lives in. A new school fi-
nance system must be implemented to give all students equal access to
funding, and thereby, equal access to opportunity for success.
As President John F. Kennedy stated, "a child miseducated is a child
lost. ' '3° 6 The current Texas school finance system is not providing an effi-
cient system of knowledge as required by the Texas Constitution.30 7 In
other words, the system as it now stands is miseducating the students of
the State of Texas. This miseducation will undoubtedly lead to increased
dropout rates, a less educated work force, slower economic growth, and
general lack of progress throughout the state in generations to come if
the problem is not corrected.3 ° s There is no simple answer to creating a
constitutional school finance system, however, this nation and state were
not founded on the ideals of simplicity, but instead on the truism of
equality. In order to have equality of opportunity, there must first be
equality of access to funds.
306. Bartley.com, supra note 1.
307. See Final Judgment, West Orange-Cove, No. GV-100528.
308. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 23, No. 70, West Orange-Cove Con-
sol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neely, No. GV-100528, (250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Nov.
30, 2004) (citing STEVE H. MURDOCK ET AL., THE NEW TEXAS POPuLATION CHANGE
AND THE FuTuRE OF TEXAS 224 (2003)).
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